



EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

EUROSYSTEM

Household Inflation Expectations: Recent Research Insights for Monetary Policy

CNB Workshop on
Household Inflation
Expectations

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Geoff Kenny
European Central Bank




Background and motivation

- Economists have always believed **consumer inflation expectations** matter for understanding economic outcomes, though they did not until more recently take their measurement very seriously
- Recent years has seen a very significant investment by central banks in the **direct measurement** of the subjective inflation expectations of households via surveys
- In parallel significant increase in **international scientific studies** on household inflation expectations, including across ESCB



Interest in consumer inflation expectations

- ECB speeches mentioning consumer inflation expectations (in %), lhs
- OECD central banks with household inflation expectation surveys (count), lhs
- Journal articles on consumer inflation expectations (count), rhs



Source: ECB, Scopus, central bank webpages (keyword search) and authors calculation.
Latest observation: 2023.

Increased media attention to consumers inflation expectations



What have we learnt from this big recent investment?

Focus on three broad questions:

1. Do household inflation expectations matter for **economic outcomes**?
2. Are they **well-anchored around the central bank target**?
3. Are there benefits from enhanced **communication with consumers**?

And draws extensively from a recent ECB discussion paper


D'Acunto, F., Charalambakis, E., Georgarakos, D., Kenny, G., Meyer, J., and Weber, M., 2024. [Household Inflation Expectations: An Overview of Recent Insights for Monetary Policy](#), ECB Discussion Paper no. 24, May.

This presentation represents the authors' personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect the views of the ECB or the Eurosystem.

Discussion draws extensively from experiences during the 2022-23 inflation surge which was a shared experience across EU and other countries

One-year ahead inflation expectations: Euro Area, UK and US (median, in annual percentage changes)


- EA (Consumer Expectations Survey, ECB)
- UK (Inflation Attitudes Survey, BoE)
- US (Survey of Consumer Expectations, NY FED)



Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey (EA-11), latest observation: August 2024; Bank of England Inflation Attitudes Survey, latest observation: August 2024; New York Fed Survey of Consumers Inflation Expectations, latest observation: August 2024).

One-year ahead inflation expectations: Non-euro area EU countries (median, in annual percentage changes)

- EU: non-euro area member countries
- Bulgaria
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Hungary
- Poland
- Romania
- Sweden



Source: DG-ECFIN Business and Consumer Surveys, latest observation: July 2024.


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Do household inflation
expectations matter for
economic outcomes?

Do household inflation expectations matter for economic outcomes?

Yes they do matter but reality is more complex than simple textbook thinking

The (simple) textbook thinking




- **Size** and even the **direction** of the effect on consumption/saving is very heterogenous and context dependent
- Much of the new evidence is based on **Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs)** and therefore has a causal interpretation.

Size and even the **direction** of the effect on consumption/saving is very heterogenous and context dependent, e.g.

- Consumers bring forward (increase) consumption in anticipation of higher future prices (e.g. D'Acunto et al. 2022) also at the lower bound (Duca-Radu et al. 2021)
- Stronger positive effect for more educated, higher income, financially unconstrained and higher IQ consumers (Coibion et al. 2022, D'Acunto et al. 2023)
- Consumption declines in response to higher inflation expectations and lower real income expectations (Bachmann et al. 2015, Coibion et al. 2023)
- Consumers' "narrative" or subjective model behind the change in inflation expectations matters for the ultimate outcome (Andre et al. 2022, Flynn and Sastry 2022)


Randomized Control Trial (RCT) approach

- Elicited expectations are confounded by many factors
- Information provision experiments in web surveys vary the information set available to respondents in a controlled way
- This way researchers can test theories, identify causal effects and answer policy-relevant questions



Example I: Higher expected inflation due to pre-announced VAT increase

Consumer inflation expectations and durable consumption



Source: D'Acunto et al. (2022) based on a GfK Survey in Germany.

Notes: The change in durable consumption expenditure is estimated as average treatment effect of consumers affected by the VAT policy announcement compared to not affected consumers. Changes are expressed in percentage points relative to a baseline month in June 2005. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval of the estimated treatment effect.

Latest observation: June 2007.

- Very **salient and well understood** temporary increase in expected inflation in Germany
- D'Acunto et al. (2022) find **macroeconomically sizeable positive effects** of higher inflation expectations on consumption of durables (10.3%)
- Stronger effects for more **educated, higher income** and less financially constrained consumers (Duca-Radu et al. 2021)

Example II: Stagflationary dynamics and real income channel

Consumers growth outlook and inflation expectations (percentage of consumers)



Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey (EA-6) and authors calculation.
Latest observation: December 2023.

• **Stagflationary narrative** (Candia et al. 2020) took hold weaker growth and higher inflation.

- Expected real income channel dominates (Coibion et al. 2023) with 31% of consumers in CES indicated they would **cut spending**
- Consumers' "narrative" or **subjective model** behind the change in inflation expectations matters for the ultimate outcome (Andre et al. 2022, Flynn and Sastry 2022)

Disentangling 1st and 2nd moment effects of inflation expectations

Georgarakos, D, Y Gorodnichenko, O Coibion and G Kenny (2024), 'DP19563 The Causal Effects of Inflation Uncertainty on Households' Beliefs and Actions', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 19563. CEPR Press, Paris & London. <https://cepr.org/publications/dp19563>

- Much recent research has focused on **how point predictions** for inflation affect beliefs and actions; but virtually **no evidence** on the **distinct** role of consumer **uncertainty about inflation**
- **Measurement** of uncertainty in surveys is a relatively new development and linking it with actual household behavior is quite rare
- With decades of low and stable inflation in advanced economies, there has been **limited historical variation** in inflation uncertainty, making time series methods harder to use

Disentangling 1st and 2nd moment effects

Georgarakos, D, Y Gorodnichenko, O Coibion and G Kenny (2024), 'DP19563 The Causal Effects of Inflation Uncertainty on Households' Beliefs and Actions', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 19563. CEPR Press, Paris & London. <https://cepr.org/publications/dp19563>

- **Randomized Control Trial:** We use an RCT approach with randomized information treatments to different groups of households to induce *exogenous* variation in household expectations and uncertainty about future inflation in the euro area
- **Follow-up Surveys to Measure Outcomes:** By tracking the same households over time, we can measure how/whether the exogenous variation in inflation uncertainty (net of first moment expectations) affected household decisions:
 - **Spending** (durables and non-durables)
 - Propensity to invest and actual **investment** in financial assets
 - **Labor** search and employment outcomes
 - Other choices (e.g., **mortgage** type; **shopping** intensity)

Disentangling 1st and 2nd moment effects: Information treatments

T1 (first moment): *The average prediction among professional forecasters is that inflation in the euro area will be at 2.5% over the next 12 months.*

T2 (second moment): *Professional forecasters are exceptionally uncertain right now about inflation compared to recent years. As a result, there is a significant difference of 3.1 percentage points between the lowest and the highest predictions about inflation in the euro area over the next 12 months.*

T3 (first and second moment): *The average prediction among professional forecasters is that inflation in the euro area will be at 2.5% over the next 12 months. At the same time, professional forecasters are exceptionally uncertain right now about inflation compared to recent years. As a result, there is a significant difference of 3.1 percentage points between the lowest and the highest predictions about inflation in the euro area over the next 12 months.*

Purchases of durable goods: One-month post-treatment

Dependent variable: indicator variable is a durable good is purchased*100

	Home	Durable	Car	Holiday package	Luxury items	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Posterior mean	0.421	4.812***	0.483	1.934	0.539*	0.451
	(0.268)	(1.369)	(0.315)	(1.578)	(0.283)	(0.863)
Posterior uncertainty (log)*100	-0.025**	-0.230***	-0.024*	-0.091	-0.021**	-0.055*
	(0.010)	(0.057)	(0.013)	(0.065)	(0.011)	(0.034)
Observations	11,514	11,509	11,504	11,513	11,519	11,481
R-squared	0.00	-0.04	-0.00	0.10	0.02	0.03
1 st stage F-stat (mean)	118.5	114.7	117.6	115	117.7	112.4
1 st stage F-stat (uncert)	99.38	99.33	98.19	100.5	100.6	100.1
KP Wald test	10.69	9.451	10.46	10.53	10.49	10.32

- Uncertainty has **sizeable negative effects**, net of first moments, on spending
- **Persist** 2 months after RCT

Disentangling 1st and 2nd moment effects of inflation expectations

Purchases of durable goods: first-moment only

Dependent variable: indicator variable is a durable good is purchased.

	Home	Durable	Car	Holiday package	Luxury items	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
One month after treatment						
Posterior mean	-0.305***	-1.695***	-0.325***	-1.158**	-0.208***	-1.452***
	(0.066)	(0.400)	(0.078)	(0.501)	(0.071)	(0.267)
Observations	8,654	8,645	8,645	8,637	8,677	8,634
R-squared	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.12	0.04	0.03
1 st stage F-stat (mean)	344.8	326.6	341.2	329	346.3	329.1

- very similar results **two- and three-months post-treatment**
- in line with results from earlier RCTs on inflation expectations (Coibion et al. 2022 & 2023)

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Are household inflation expectations well-anchored around the central bank target?


Are household inflation expectations well-anchored around target?

No – not really

- **Limited attention to official inflation news or news about monetary policy**
 - Low levels of inflation attention but increasing as inflation rises (Weber et al. 2024)
 - Consumers' inflation expectations do not respond to monetary policy announcements (Lamla and Vinogradov 2019) or to forward guidance (De Fiore et al. 2022)
- **Highly subjective inflation expectations based on own personal experiences**
 - Own shopping experience shape expectations for inflation
 - Gender roles (e.g. shopping responsibilities), demographic differences (Gomes, Monteiro and Ribeiro 2024) and life-time experiences (Malmendier and Nagel 2016, Goldfayn-Frank and Wohlfart 2020) e.g. of hyperinflation
 - Influence of imperfect memory (“selective recall”), emotions and sentiment on survey responses
- **Clear evidence of extrapolative behavior and overreaction to observed price signals**
 - Consumers mechanically extrapolate recent trends into the future (e.g. Coibion et al. 2018, Huber, Minina and Schmidt 2023)
 - Overreaction: A change in expectations today systematically leads to larger forecast errors in the future

Are household inflation expectations well-anchored around ECB target?

Co-movement of short- and longer-term inflation expectations (annual percentage changes)




Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey, ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters and authors calculation.
Notes: Binscatter plot of the pooled February 2022 to December 2023 data. The chart depicts variation in expectations within individuals over time by means of a fixed-effects regression. Inflation news is measured as the within individual variation of consumers one year forecast of inflation. Five year ahead inflation expectations are currently collected as experimental data and not published as part of the regular CES data.

- Consumers **3 and 5 year ahead** inflation expectations are much more imperfectly anchored compared with experts
- **Key question for monetary policy:** Does any observed change in medium or long-run expectations reflect:
 - (i) An overreaction that may subsequently correct?
 - (ii) A more genuine shift in medium-run risks price stability?

Are household inflation expectations well-anchored around ECB target?

No – not really . . . but not completely adrift either.

Term-structure of consumers' inflation expectations



Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey and authors calculation.

Notes: Pooled June 2022 to June 2023 data. Five year ahead inflation expectations are currently collected as experimental data and not published as part of the regular CES data.


- **Downward sloping term structure** of expected inflation (D'Acunto et al. 2024)

- **Reduced dispersion** of 3 and 5 year ahead inflation expectations

- Both imply **some traction** of the central bank's objective as a guide for consumers' inflation expectations in the more medium term


Anchoring challenge I: Inflation (in)attention

Euro area consumers inflation attention



- **Majority** of consumers report **at least some attention** to inflation

Euro area consumers inflation expectations (1ya)



- Consumers with **higher attention** to inflation hold **higher inflation** expectations

Anchoring challenge I: Time-varying inflation attention

Weber, M., Candia, B., Afrouzi H. Ropele, T., Lluberas, R., Frache, S., Meyer, B.H., Kumar, S., Gorodnichenko, Y., Georgarakos, D., Coibion, O. and Kenny, G. (2023). Tell me something I don't already know: Learning in low and high-inflation settings, forthcoming, Econometrica

- Theories of inattention emphasize agents balancing costs and benefits of acquiring and processing information:
 - Sticky information (Reis 2006)
 - Rational inattention (Sims 2003)
- The *degree of inattention should be endogenous to economic conditions*

Anchoring challenge I: Time-varying inflation attention


Does the **attention** that economic agents pay to **inflation** and **monetary policy** communication remain relatively stable or does it vary depending on the prevailing inflationary environment?

- Pool comparable RCTs across countries:
 - U.S., Euro-area, New Zealand, Uruguay, Italy, Netherlands
- Pool comparable RCTs *within a country* over time:
 - When inflation is low and stable
 - When inflation is high and stable
 - When inflation goes from low to high
- Pool comparable RCTs across agents:
 - Households and firms
- Pool comparable information treatments:
 - Information about recent inflation
 - Information about inflation targets
 - Information about inflation forecasts

Anchoring challenge II: Asymmetric updating of inflation beliefs

Asymmetric updating of inflation expectations to news

(in annual percentage changes)




Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey (EA-6 before April 2022, EA-11 afterwards), pooled April 2020 to January 2024 data.

- Inflation expectations respond more quickly to **inflationary than to disinflationary news**
- Implying that **upward de-anchoring** can be more swift
- And path of expectations moving **back to target from above** may be more sluggish

Consumers perceived inflation and actual inflation

Perceived inflation

(mean, in annual percentage changes)



Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey (EA-6), latest observation: August 2024.

- Inflation **perceptions gap** closed quickly as inflation was **rising**
- As inflation **declined** perceptions moved down **more sluggishly**
- Open questions:
 - Do consumers' inflation perceptions confuse price level with rates of change?
 - Would consumers prefer **price level targeting**?

3


Are there benefits from
enhanced communication
with consumers?

Are there benefits from enhanced communication with consumers?

Some caution but ultimately yes

How many consumers heard about the ECB after the Strategy Review?

(percentage of consumers)



Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) (EA-6).


- On a cautionary note, the general public is very **hard to reach** (Ehrmann, Georgarakos and Kenny 2023)
- About **30% of euro area consumers are** “not much” or “not at all” interested in monetary policy
- Attention to inflation and monetary policy rises as inflation rises; does this offer a “**window of opportunity**” for communication with the public ? (Weber et al. 2024)

Are there benefits from enhanced communication with consumers?

Some caution but ultimately yes

Knowledge about and trust in the ECB

(trust in the ECB 0 (no trust) to 10 (complete trust))




Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey and authors calculation.

Notes: Binscatter plot based on 2020 to 2023 data (net of country-specific effects). Knowledge about the ECB is collected on a multi-item scale each August on experimental basis in the CES.

- Increasing consumer knowledge about monetary policy via our communication can contribute to increasing **trust in the ECB**
- Increasing trust is important (Christelis et al. 2020, Rumler and Valderrama 2020)
- Higher trust can help to better **anchor inflation expectations**

Are there benefits from enhanced communication with consumers?

The anchoring effect of increasing trust



- Increasing trust is important (Christelis et al. 2020, Rumler and Valderrama 2020)
- Higher trust can help to better **anchor inflation expectations**
- Both from **above and from below**

Are there benefits from enhanced communication with consumers?

*Ehrmann, M., Georgarakos, D. and Kenny, G., 2023. Credibility gains from communicating with the public: evidence from the ECB's new monetary policy strategy, **ECB Working Paper No. 2785.***

- If we can reach consumers, what are the **causal effects** from communication on central bank **credibility**?

- Credibility measure:

How likely do you think it is that the ECB will maintain price stability in the euro area economy over the next 3 years? [0%....100%]

- free of numerical framing to 2%

Treatment group 1: *Symmetric Target (ST) only*

The ECB aims for a **2% inflation target** over the medium term as the best way to maintain price stability. The target is **symmetric**: inflation may sometimes be slightly above it or below. The ECB looks through short-term deviations. **Persistent negative and positive deviations are regarded as equally undesirable.**

Treatment group 2: *Symmetric Target (ST)* + *Explanation*


The ECB aims for a **2% inflation target** over the medium term as the best way to maintain price stability. The target is **symmetric**: inflation may sometimes be slightly above it or below. The ECB looks through short-term deviations. **Persistent negative and positive deviations are regarded as equally undesirable.**

A target of 2% has an important function: it creates space so that monetary policy can have its stabilising effect. In bad times, such as during the pandemic, **monetary policy stimulates the economy** through low interest rates and so has **significant favourable effects on economic growth and employment.** This may also imply a transitory period in which inflation is moderately above the target of 2%.

Are there benefits from enhanced communication with consumers?

Likelihood that the ECB delivers price stability over the medium-term (3 years)

(treatment effect on ECB credibility, in percentage points)




Source: Ehrmann, Georganakos, Kenny (2023) based on the ECB Consumer Expectations Survey.

Notes: The figure depicts the treatment effects (with 95% confidence intervals) on the ECB's credibility to achieve price stability over the next 3 years.

- Communicating our 2% target can **improve credibility**
- Effect is further enhanced if a **simple explanation** on stabilising role of monetary policy is added
- Heterogeneity: Effects driven by more **financially literate consumers**
- Yet explanations are also effective for **less financially literate** consumers

Are there benefits from enhanced communication with consumers?

Information sources about monetary policy (percentage of consumers)




Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey (EA-11).
Notes: In August 2023, on an experimental basis consumers were asked which sources they would use over the next 12 months to acquire information about monetary policy.

- Consumers use a **wide range of information channels** to learn about monetary policy
- These channels impact their expectations (Conrad, Enders and Glas 2022)
- An optimal communication strategy needs to exploit all of them !

Communication channels

Information about the ECB: channels by age group

(% of all respondents, by information source)



Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) – September 2021

Note: “In the past two months, have you seen or heard information about the European Central Bank (ECB) from any of the following sources?”. Apart from “No info”, all other options are not mutually exclusive, leading to a total sum higher than 100% of the respondents. Weighted estimates.


Heterogeneity by age:

- *Older*: higher shares use **traditional** channels
- *Younger*: higher shares use **social media**

The messenger matters: Diversity and communication effectiveness

Consumers trust in the ECB and their local National Central Banks

(average trust in the centra bank)



Source: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey (EA-11) , pooled Feb. 21' to Jan. 24' data. For each country, consumers are asked about trust in the ECB on a scale from 0 (no trust) to 10 (full trust) and separately about their trust in the national central bank.

- Also, **diversity in our policy committees** can help to reach heterogenous audiences in a more targeted manner (D'Acunto et al. 2022)
- Importance of **national diversity** in a European context (Wabitsch, 2024)

Thank You !

Contact: Geoff.Kenny@ecb.europa.eu

Summary of key messages

- **Households act on their beliefs about inflation**
 - Inflation expectations effect economic outcomes and therefore monetary policy transmission but they do so in a complex and context dependent way
 - Recent episode of higher inflation expectations likely reduced consumption via the real income channel (“stagflationary narrative”) and more elevated inflation uncertainty
- **Consumers inflation expectations are highly subjective and only imperfectly anchored**
 - Imperfect anchoring poses challenges and risks for monetary policy
 - Suggesting scope to clarify the role of these indicators in central bank reaction functions
- **Communicating with the public enhances monetary policy effectiveness**
 - While the public is hard to reach building consumer knowledge via communication helps strengthen trust, enhancing credibility
 - When attention to inflation and monetary policy is high, there is a “window of opportunity” for communicating but changing beliefs is more challenging in such an environment

Thank You !

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