Disclosing Dissent in Monetary Policy Committees

Jan Filáček, Lucie Kokešová Matějková

Dissenting opinions in monetary policy meetings are a common phenomenon and an integral part of committee decisions, but not every central bank discloses them to the same degree. This paper discusses the pros and cons of the various degrees of transparency of 14 central banks in disclosing differences of opinion among committee members. It focuses on the experience of the Swedish Riksbank and the Czech National Bank, both of which publish attributed minutes of their boards’ monetary policy meetings. We argue that attributed minutes, which the Czech National Bank started to publish in February 2020, have provided market participants and the public with an opportunity to better understand the board members’ individual opinions and behaviour. It can also be argued that attributed minutes have benefited the board members themselves, as they give them more room to present and explain their arguments.

JEL codes: D71, D83, E52, E58

Keywords: Central bank communication, dissent, minutes, monetary policy committees, transparency

Issued: December 2022

Download: RPN No. 2/2022 (pdf, 563 kB)